OPEN LETTER TO PROF. JOASH AMUPITAN
Chairman, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC),
Headquarters,
Zambezi Crescent,
Maitama, Abuja.
By:
NWAMBU Gabriel Chibuzor, Ph.D.
Director General, Centre for Credible Leadership and Citizens Awareness (CCLCA)
INEC Accredited Observer
I. Executive Summary
The Anambra State Governorship election held on November 8, 2025, represented a critical juncture in Nigeria’s democratic trajectory. While the election marked a clear success for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in ensuring that votes cast were accurately counted and collated—a triumph of institutional integrity—it simultaneously exposed a devastating failure in electoral law enforcement. 
The massive and unprecedented scale of vote buying, brazenly perpetrated by agents of political parties, notably the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) and the All Progressive Congress (APC), signals a new, institutionalised threat to Nigeria’s democracy.
This paper posits that vote buying is the direct result of INEC’s successful tightening of electoral loopholes, and unequivocally states that the responsibility for combating this crime now rests squarely with the Police, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC). Failure to act decisively in Anambra will spell doom for the upcoming 2026 and 2027 elections.
II. The Observation from Anambra: A Systemic Breakdown
Our field observations across multiple Polling Units in Anambra on election day revealed a troubling pattern that goes beyond mere isolated incidents of electoral inducement.
1. Brazen Inducement: Vote buying was conducted openly and directly within the vicinity of the Polling Units. This was often executed immediately after a voter exited the voting cubicle, suggesting the “Vote for Cash” approach where proof of voting for the purchasing party was often demanded or confirmed.
2. Complicity of Law Enforcement: Most alarming was the observed role of some law enforcement agents. Their strategic proximity to the voting cubicles and subsequent payment points, coupled with their inaction, rendered them passive accomplices. Their presence did not deter the crime; it effectively offered a layer of tacit consent, undermining the principle of electoral security and integrity.
3. Absence of Anti-Graft Agencies: Despite the clear, criminal nature of the transactions, there was a conspicuous absence of operatives from the EFCC and the ICPC—agencies with a statutory mandate to curb financial crimes and corruption, including electoral bribery. This vacuum allowed vote buying to flourish unchecked.
III. The Paradox of Progress: INEC’s Success as the Catalyst for Vote Buying
The prevalence of vote buying, while destructive, must be analyzed within the context of recent electoral reforms. Historically, electoral fraud relied on two pillars: result writing (manipulation of figures at collation centers) and voter suppression.
INEC’s deployment and optimization of technology, specifically the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the real-time electronic transmission of results via the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV), have successfully dismantled the viability of result writing. The votes of the people are finally beginning to count, making it significantly harder for “big men” to sit in their parlours and determine outcomes.
The shift is strategic: Desperate politicians, compelled by INEC’s sealed loopholes, have been forced to migrate their rigging mechanism to the only place left: the Polling Unit, engaging the voter directly. This costly and unprecedented level of voter inducement is, in an ironic and perverse sense, evidence that INEC’s electoral reforms and the will of the electorate are beginning to succeed. The integrity of the voting process itself (accreditation and collation) is higher than before, hence the need to corrupt the will of the voter at the point of decision.
IV. The Enforcement Deficit and the Institutionalization of Corruption
Vote buying is a crime clearly prohibited under Sections 121 and 127 of the Electoral Act. It is a financial crime that directly undermines the basis of governance.
The Anambra election has highlighted a fundamental defect in our electoral ecosystem: while INEC has successfully delivered technical integrity, the enforcement agencies have failed in their mandate to deter and prosecute electoral offences.
The lack of effective intervention by the Police, EFCC, and ICPC is disastrous for two reasons:
1. Erosion of Accountability: When perpetrators are not arrested, investigated, and prosecuted, the culture of impunity is solidified. Political elites perceive electoral crimes as low-risk, high-reward ventures.
2. Institutionalization of Voter Inducement: The practice is rapidly becoming institutionalized, creating an expectation among the electorate for gratification in subsequent polls. This damages democratic culture, replacing a citizen-leader covenant of service and accountability with a transactional relationship of “cash-and-carry democracy.” This actively discourages competent, non-monetised leadership from emerging.
V. Looking Forward: Implications for Ekiti, Osun (2026), and the 2027 General Elections
The Anambra experience serves as an urgent alarm for the elections scheduled in Ekiti and Osun (2026), and the critical 2027 General Elections.
If the high-level impunity witnessed in Anambra is not immediately addressed, we project that:
1. Monetization will Intensify: Political parties, having tested the limits of vote buying in Anambra and faced no consequences, will intensify the practice in future elections, leading to inflationary pressures on the cost of political participation.
2. Increased Voter Apathy Among the Undecided: Citizens committed to issues-based politics will grow more cynical and apathetic, believing that their non-monetised vote is irrelevant.
3. Security Failure Replication: Without a clear directive and mandate for aggressive intervention and prosecution, security agents will likely replicate the passive or complicit roles observed in Anambra.
VI. Recommendations and Call to Action
The Centre for Credible Leadership and Citizens Awareness (CCLCA) demands immediate and decisive action to safeguard Nigeria’s democratic future.
1. Immediate Prosecution (EFCC/ICPC): The EFCC and ICPC must immediately activate their intelligence networks to arrest and prosecute all known and alleged perpetrators and sponsors of vote buying in the Anambra election, including party agents and co-conspirators. The use of digital money transfers, as reported in various elections, must be aggressively traced.
2. Law Enforcement Redesign: The Inspector General of Police, in collaboration with INEC, must immediately review the deployment protocol for law enforcement agents in Polling Units, ensuring that officers are not strategically positioned in a manner that compromises the secrecy of the ballot or facilitates the transactional exchange of money.
3. Mandate Clarity: There must be a public, unambiguous declaration by the leadership of the EFCC and ICPC stating their preparedness and operational strategy to actively combat electoral inducement in Ekiti and Osun (2026) and 2027. This must include dedicated Rapid Response Teams specifically tasked with arresting financial crime perpetrators at the polling unit level.
4. Civic Education: A massive, sustained, and collaborative civic education campaign, involving INEC and civil society organizations like CCLCA, must be launched to sensitize the electorate against the long-term, devastating consequences of selling their votes.
The Anambra 2025 election has confirmed INEC’s success in fixing the back end of the electoral process. The challenge now lies with the front end: securing the integrity of the voter’s will. We must address this menace before it consumes the very democracy we are fighting to sustain.
