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Uncertainties over debts and the future of NigComSat 1R

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By Sonny Aragba-Akpore

Nigeria’s only communications satellite, NigComSat 1R,is troubled and appears to be in a wheelchair, practically struggling for survival. Its troubles began on February 14, 2014, immediately after the removal of its pioneer Chief Executive, Timasaniyu Ahmed Rufai, in alleged questionable circumstances. His removal was ordered by the then Communications Minister, Mrs Omobola Johnson, who later appointed a team to carry out a forensic examination of the company’s books since the launch of NigComSat 1R on December 19, 2011. Johnson named Ms Abimbola Alale as Ahmed-Rufai’s replacement. Before her appointment, Alale was Executive Director (Marketing).

But not much came out of the forensic examination to date, except that the company appears to have seen better days and is swimming against the tide. ​With a bucket of troubles and an incorrigible wage bill, which is believed to be unsustainable, the Nigerian satellite is now being managed from Kashi, China, contrary to global standards, where communications satellites are usually managed locally by their operators from domestic ground stations. Strangely, the Nigerian satellite has not been a commercial success since its launch. Low patronage, very little confidence by local customers and a lack of investment by its owners, the government, may have accounted for this. But the Chinese who built it say NigComSat 1R has immense capacity for broadcasting and telecommunication services, with special potential for broadband connectivity, but local patronage is very poor.

“There is no problem with the market,” because countries like Bolivia, with TKSat-1, the country’s first communications satellite, built at an estimated cost of around $300 million, similar to NIGCOMSAT-1R, generate between $10 million and $20 million yearly.  By 2020, it had earned more than $80 million over its first four years, averaging roughly $20 million yearly.

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In South Africa, the South African National Space Agency (SANSA) and local partners such as CubeSpace, Simera Sense, and Astrofica generate revenue from satellite-based Earth-observation data, hardware components, and downstream applications.  In 2023, these companies were part of Africa’s broader commercial space sector, which included 327 firms collectively earning US$309 million. So, what is the problem with the Nigerian satellite that has not recorded any commercial success since its launch 15 years ago? Despite denials by officials of NigComSat 1R that it was not indebted to its partners, China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), there is growing uncertainty that the satellite is swimming in troubled waters. Reports have it that managers of the satellite, Nigerian Communications Satellite Limited, are busy defending an $11.4 million debt owed to CGWIC for services rendered in hosting the satellite in the Kashi ground station in Xichang, China, since the ground station of NigComsat was damaged in 2019. Although NigComSat Limited denied this debt, CGWIC insists there is indeed a debt, even when no official statement says whether or not a debt was outstanding. Media reports say the debt is real.

Following the damage of the ground station in Abuja in 2019, the Kashi station in China became the main controlling station instead of playing the backup role it was initially designed forCGWIC built and launched the Satellite in Kashi on December 19, 2011 and has been working closely with its Nigerian partner, NigComsat Limited to maintain the satellite from the Karshi ground station to save the satellite from premature collapse. This help came at a cost as the NigComSat Limited entered into a management contract with CGWIC for the primary control of the satellite from Kashi in China. According to the terms of the contract, the Nigerian company was expected to pay CGWIC about $1.6m yearly for maintenance.

But as of December 2025, the Nigerian company allegedly failed to remit any payment and thus accumulated a debt of $11.4m. Several strategies adopted to recover the debt have failed to yield any meaningful results, including a letter of demand for payment and a threat to abort hosting the satellite if the debt was not paid. In a letter signed by the Director, Marketing, Africa at CGWIC, Liu Lan, the Chinese company asked the management of NigComSat Limited to inform its customers of the development because it wouldn’t guarantee the performance of the satellite should it fail to pay up the debt in 30 days.

The letter reads, “As of December 31, 2025, the total net outstanding debt owed by NIGCOMSAT to CGWIC stood at USD11,442,335.89. This figure accounts for deductions for services NIGCOMSAT has been provided by us, yet the balance remains substantially unresolved.” “Regrettably, despite our continuous provision of essential Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (TT&C) services from Kashi China, no payments have been received from NIGCOMSAT Ltd. since 2019. “For the past seven years, CGWIC has deliberately delayed standard debt collection actions out of goodwill and a desire to ensure the continuity of Nigeria’s satellite operations.

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“Furthermore, despite negotiations in 2023 and early 2025, in which CGWIC agreed in principle to reduce the debt, NIGCOMSAT has repeatedly failed to meet the agreed-upon conditions to make partial payments.” Therefore, CGWIC is hereby issuing a final thirty (30) day ultimatum. NIGCOMSAT is required to either make the payment of USD11,442,335.89 orprovide a formal, legally binding guarantee of payment within thirty (30) days of the date of this letter.

“If full payment or an acceptable guarantee is not provided within this 30-day window, CGWIC will suspend service on the active transponders of the NIGCOMSAT 1R”. But officials of Nigcomsat Limited denied any debt to CGWIC or any friction in that regard. These debts have been hanging since 2019 when Nigeria’s ground control infrastructure located in Obasanjo Space Centre, Lugbe, Abuja, malfunctioned due to lightning. In satellite operations, control is maintained through Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (TT&C) systems that monitor the spacecraft’s health, determine its position in orbit, and send commands to adjust its orientation and orbital slot.

If the TT&C link is lost, a geostationary satellite can quickly drift out of its designated position due to gravitational and solar forces. When that happens, services such as broadcasting, internet connectivity, and military communications can be disrupted. Nigeria’s primary TT&C facility was located at the ground station in Lugbe, Abuja. CGWIC said the facility was severely damaged by lightning in 2019. “Lightning destroyed the Abuja ground station,” Liu said. “After that, they could not control the satellite, so the control was transferred to our station in Kashgar.”

The Kashgar Ground Station, also known as the Kashi Ground Station, is located in Xinchang, China. “We have controlled the satellite from 2019 until today,” Liu was quoted as explaining that the arrangement was originally allowed under a 2014 technical support agreement that established China’s ground station as a backup control facility.

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But once the      Abuja system stopped functioning, CGWIC became the primary maintenance provider.
Under the 2014 agreement, Nigeria was required to pay CGWIC for both backup services and full operational control, according to Liu.  Although NIGCOMSAT declined to confirm the agreement, it admitted it had a support contract in place with the vendor but gave no details.

CGWIC officials were quoted as saying that the Primary control service alone costs more than $1 million yearly, while additional charges apply for backup operations and other technical services like equipment repair and purchase. The officials said that since 2019, the company has received no payment. “For over seven years, the unpaid fees accumulated into the $11.4 million debt now at the centre of the dispute. Despite the growing arrears, CGWIC continued providing services to avoid jeopardising the satellite. But how long this continues remains unclear, especially as the satellite gets to its terminal date.

NIGCOMSAT plans to launch two satellites in the next four years. They have named them as Nigcomsat 2A and 2B according to the Chief Executive, Jane Egerton-Idehen.

“For 2A and 2B, we have started the process. We have closed the tender and are now back into the financing and implementation stage. 2A is built to come up in 2028, and 2B for 2029.

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“When they are up and running, they are expected to provide security within the borders and neighbouring countries. They will support the security agencies because data collection and intelligence in real time is important. Satellites like communication satellites allow that, irrespective of where they are,” she said.
NIGCOMSAT has been embroiled in controversy since Nigeria’s quest into space.

When it first launched into space in 2007, with NigComsat 1 and the failure that occurred just after 18 months in space, in 2008, and the replacement satellite christened Nigcomsat 1R in December 2011, Nigerians have cast doubts on the satellite. Although it has survived nearly 15 years since its return, so much mistrust has followed the company. Poor infrastructure management, fuelled by low investment and apathy in marketing the services have left the place in a near comatose. It is, however, not clear whether the company will survive when this satellite’s lifespan elapses, since there is no backup.

And the debt overhang has further diminished the status of the future of the wobbling venture. But while dismissing the story as fake news, Head, Corporate Communications at NigComsat Limited, Stephen Kwande, said:
“It is unclear where this misleading information is coming from. “We have been in touch with our business partners, the executives and representatives of CGWIC in Nigeria, and they have made it clear they are not the ones giving out such information.” According to him, the Chinese firm also expressed concern about the spread of what it described as inaccurate reports regarding the partnership. “Our relationship with our business partners, CGWIC, is not in any crisis as reported, and we continue to remain strong in our business relationship and partnership. adding that both parties recently held discussions to reaffirm their collaboration. Despite the denials, the situation of the satellite looks precarious, as any threat to the fragile existence of the satellite spells discomfort for its few patrons.

With a lifespan of 15 years since launch on December 19, 2011, by December 2026 it would elapse, and there is no backup. This makes things more complicated. So, what happens to customers using its links is a big dilemma. Denials of Nigcomsat officials appear to be tongue in cheek, as information available further shows the debt exists and remains unpaid. In a February 28, 2026, email to Jane Egerton-Idehen, the managing director of NIGCOMSAT, CGWIC noted that the outstanding debt had reached $11,442,335.89 as of December 31, 2025. “I wrote about the outstanding payment in December 2025 and did not get any feedback from NIGCOMSAT,” stated Liu Lan, CGWIC’s Head, Africa Operations, who has worked on the project since its inception.  The debt, the email noted, rose from technical control services that CGWIC continues to provide for years without payment. The denial of Nigcomsat is a clear manifest contradiction, especially when the Chief Executive is being quoted as saying she would not want to throw figures in the open space, a veiled admission of the debts.

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Opinion

THE SUNDAY STEW – 16: The Three-Month Sprint (2): Vocabulary, Concepts, Metaphors

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By Max Amuchie | The Sunday Stew

Every serious intellectual undertaking eventually reaches a threshold where it can no longer rely entirely on inherited language. It must create its own vocabulary.

The three-month sprint that produced The Insecurity Triad, the Trinity of State Decay (TSD), and the Decoupling Sovereignty Index (DSI) crossed that threshold repeatedly. New realities demanded new concepts, and new concepts demanded new names.

Some of those names describe the architecture of collapse. Others describe the mechanisms that sustain it. Still others describe what recovery requires. Together, they form a vocabulary of sovereignty — its decay, its distortion, and its possible reconstruction.

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The Grammar Beneath the Vocabulary
Before naming the concepts, it is worth naming the architecture that organises them.

The Insecurity Triad identified three vectors through which rival sovereignty is produced: Money, Land, and Mind. Kidnapping finances violence through ransom economies — that is Money. Banditry governs territory and controls the means of production — that is Land. Terrorism reshapes the ideological order, rewriting who commands loyalty and who commands fear — that is Mind.

These three vectors do not operate in isolation. They converge. And their convergence is what makes The Insecurity Triad a system rather than a catalogue of threats.

What the Trinity of State Decay reveals is what happens to a state when that convergence is sustained. Money drains the state’s fiscal and security capacity. Land slips from its territorial grip. Mind withdraws — citizens, communities, and eventually institutions themselves stop believing that the state is the relevant authority. The Trinity maps the structural consequences of what the Triad set in motion.

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The Decoupling Sovereignty Index then asks the measurement question: how far has each vector decoupled? M1 tracks the Money dimension — the degree to which ransom economies and rival revenue systems have displaced the state. L tracks the Land dimension — the erosion of territorial authority and enforceability. M2 tracks the Mind dimension — the collapse of psychological allegiance and institutional legitimacy.

Every concept that follows in this column lives inside that architecture. The Institutional Mirage is what the Mind dimension produces at the level of governance. The Shadow Order is what Land and Money produce when they combine to constitute rival authority. The Ransom Economy is Money in its most organised form. Constitutional Erasure is Land rewritten at gunpoint. The Psychology of the Table is Mind in its most exclusionary expression.

Money. Land. Mind. That is the grammar. What follows is the vocabulary it generates.

The Architecture of Collapse
Among the formulations that emerged was the Trinity of State Decay.

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Consider what happens when a state begins to lose its grip.
It does not lose one thing. It loses three — simultaneously, and in ways that accelerate each other.

Territory slips first, or perhaps institutions do, or perhaps the people withdraw their faith before either of the others move. The sequence varies. What does not vary is the convergence.

The first dimension is territorial: the state’s control of physical space becomes contested, fragmented, then absent in places it once claimed without effort.

The second is institutional: governance structures remain formally intact — ministries open, officials report, procedures are observed — but effectiveness drains away, and with it, public confidence.

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The third is psychological: citizens stop believing. Not all at once. Not loudly. But progressively, they withdraw their emotional allegiance from the state and redirect their trust toward other identities, other authorities, other protections.
And then the loop closes.

Land is lost because institutions have weakened. Institutions weaken because citizens no longer trust them. Citizens withdraw their trust because the state can no longer protect the land.

Each failure licenses the next. Each decay deepens the others. The trinity does not merely describe deterioration — it drives it.

That is what makes it a trinity rather than a list.

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But what fills the space that the decaying state vacates? Two concepts answer that question, and they must be understood together.

The first is the Institutional Mirage. When a state loses empirical authority — the actual capacity to protect, compel and deliver — its formal structures do not always disappear. They persist. Ministers are appointed. Budgets are passed. Ceremonies are conducted. The architecture of governance remains visible, sometimes impressively so. But it no longer functions as architecture. It functions as scenery.

The Institutional Mirage is the state performing sovereignty it no longer possesses.

The second concept is the Shadow Order. Into the spaces the Mirage cannot reach, alternative authority structures move. They may be armed groups, criminal networks, ethnic militias, or insurgent organisations. They collect their own revenues, enforce their own rules, and provide their own version of protection — however brutal or extractive. They do not merely fill a vacuum. They constitute a rival sovereignty.

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The Institutional Mirage and the Shadow Order are not opposites. They are a system. One performs authority without possessing it. The other possesses authority without performing it in the language of the state. Together, they represent the decoupling at the heart of the Trinity of State Decay: the separation of juridical sovereignty from empirical sovereignty, of the state that exists on paper from the state that exists on the ground.

The Mechanisms of Sustenance
Collapse of this kind does not sustain itself through inertia alone. It requires mechanisms — arrangements, transactions and distortions that keep the system operational even as it deteriorates.

Three concepts describe these mechanisms:
The first is the Ransom Economy. In zones where the Shadow Order operates and the Institutional Mirage cannot reach, kidnapping ceases to be merely criminal. It becomes economic. Ransom payments circulate as a form of revenue — funding armed groups, sustaining supply chains of complicity, and generating employment in the logistics of abduction and negotiation. The Ransom Economy is not a disorder within the economy. In the territories where it operates, it is the economy.

The second mechanism is Pacification Bargaining. Faced with armed groups it cannot defeat militarily, the state — or the communities caught between the state and the Shadow Order — enters into informal negotiations. Cattle corridors are quietly conceded. Seasonal movements are permitted. Attacks pause in exchange for unspoken accommodations. The bargaining is never acknowledged publicly, because acknowledging it would require admitting the limits of state authority. But it happens. And each round of bargaining, however tactically rational, extends the life of the arrangement it was meant to manage.

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The third is Constitutional Erasure. This is not a legal phenomenon. It does not occur in courtrooms or parliamentary chambers. It occurs on the ground, at gunpoint. This is, in the most precise sense, a Violent Amendment of the Constitution — not through any legitimate process of revision, but through the barrel of a gun. The armed group does not petition the state to redraw its map. It redraws it unilaterally, inscribing its own authority where the constitution once held.

Constitutional Erasure is the illegal process by which armed non-state actors unmake the official state map and replace it with their own sovereign order. Where the state’s constitution says one thing about who governs a territory, the gun says another — and the gun wins. The armed group does not merely occupy the space. It renames it. It redraws it. It inscribes its own authority onto territory that the constitution still claims but can no longer hold.

This is counter-constitutional inscription: a rival cartography written in violence.

The constitution remains on paper. But on the ground, a different document governs — unwritten, unratified, enforced by the threat of death. What is erased is not the text of the state’s founding law but the physical reality it was meant to describe.

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The Psychology of Recognition
Beneath the structural and economic dimensions of decay lies something harder to measure but no less consequential: the question of who belongs.
Political power is frequently imagined through offices, armies and constitutions. Yet societies often possess another, less visible metric of authority.
Who sits at the table?
Who is invited?
Who is absent?

The Architecture of Resurrection
Perhaps the most hopeful formulation to emerge from the sprint was the idea of the Architecture of Resurrection.

Most analyses of state fragility devote considerable attention to decline and collapse. Far less attention is given to recovery. Yet history repeatedly demonstrates that societies possess remarkable capacities for renewal.

The Architecture of Resurrection refers to the institutional, psychological and political design necessary for rebuilding state effectiveness and legitimacy after periods of profound disruption.

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Resurrection is not restoration
A building that has partially collapsed cannot simply be painted and declared repaired. It requires redesign. Its foundations must be reassessed. Structural weaknesses must be corrected. New load-bearing systems must be introduced.

The same principle applies to states
The Architecture of Resurrection therefore concerns the deliberate reconstruction of authority, trust and institutional capability. It asks difficult questions.

How is territorial control re-established?
How is confidence in institutions rebuilt?
How are psychologically alienated populations reintegrated into a common political project?
How does sovereignty become recoupled — the Institutional Mirage dissolved into functional authority, the Shadow Order displaced, the Ransom Economy dismantled, Pacification Bargaining replaced by genuine security provision, Constitutional Erasure reversed by the renewed enforceability of rights?
How are communities that have been excluded from the table brought back — not as afterthoughts but as constitutive members of the political project?

The metaphor is intentionally architectural because durable recovery requires design, sequencing and structural coherence. Political resurrection cannot be improvised.

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These concepts did not emerge in isolation. They emerged in conversation with one another— each one clarifying, qualifying or extending the others.

States do not live merely through constitutions and coercive instruments. They also live through perceptions. They survive because people believe institutions matter, believe they belong at the table, and believe collective political life remains worth investing in.

Conversely, states decay when these sustaining beliefs weaken—when the Institutional Mirage replaces genuine authority; when the Shadow Order occupies the spaces the state has abandoned; when the Ransom Economy becomes normalised; when Pacification Bargaining substitutes for security provision; when Constitutional Erasure progressively empties the law of its force; and when the Psychology of the Table degenerates into a psychology of permanent exclusion.
That is why vocabulary matters. These are not merely descriptive terms; they are diagnostic concepts that identify the mechanisms through which sovereignty decouples from authority and states slide along the continuum of decay.

The Trinity of State Decay reveals the multidimensional nature of collapse. The Institutional Mirage and the Shadow Order name the twin faces of decoupled sovereignty. The Ransom Economy, Pacification Bargaining and Constitutional Erasure describe the mechanisms that sustain it.  The Architecture of Resurrection directs attention toward the design principles of renewal.

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Together, they demonstrate that scholarship is not simply the accumulation of information. It is also the invention of language capable of capturing realities that old vocabularies struggle to describe.

For sometimes the first step toward understanding a crisis is learning to name it.

And sometimes the first step toward renewal is discovering the words that make recovery imaginable.

Trust is sacred. Stay seasoned.

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•Dr. Max Amuchie is an Independent Scholar-Journalist, Media CEO, and Lead Researcher at the Sundiata Post Intelligence Unit (SPIU). He is the architect of The Insecurity Triad framework for African security analysis, the Trinity of State Decay theory, and the Decoupling Sovereignty Index (DSI)—original, indigenous analytical  frameworks for understanding, categorising, and measuring conflict, state decay, and sovereignty in the Global South. He writes The Sunday Stew, a weekly syndicated column on faith, character, and the structural forces that shape society, with a focus on Nigeria, Africa, and the Global South in a changing world.
X (formerly Twitter): @MaxAmuchie | Email: max.a@sundiatapost.com | Tel: +234(0)8053069436

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Distinguished Ego, Reckless Falsehoods and Senator Oshiomole’s Journey of Self-Destruct

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By Ken Harries Esq

There are few spectacles more embarrassing in politics than a man arguing passionately against himself while pretending to be attacking someone else. Psychologists call this cognitive dissonance. The rest of us call it eating your own words without choking. It is a difficult performance. The audience remembers the speech made earlier out of conviction, the newspapers preserve the quotes, and the politician is left insisting that black is white and that he has always believed the reverse of what he said. This is a classic Catch-22 situation.

Senator Adams Aliyu Oshiomhole is presently engaged in such a trial. He finds himself confronted not by Senator Godswill Akpabio, but by a far more formidable adversary: his own words. The evidence against him is not supplied by his enemies. It is supplied by his own mouth. The falcon cannot hear the falconer.

In May 2025, Oshiomhole stood on the floor of the Senate and delivered one of the most effusive endorsements ever offered by a senator to another. Under Akpabio’s leadership, he posited, opposition politicians were joining the APC voluntarily and happily. The atmosphere in the Senate had become more cordial. Political tensions were easing. Defections were taking place without intimidation, coercion or conflict.

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Then came the line that would become impossible to forget. “Mr Senate President, I thought that you would enter the Guinness Book of Records.”

For Oshiomhole, Akpabio’s leadership was not merely effective but profound. It was exceptional. He described it as “truly uncommon and increasingly uncommon.” He praised Akpabio’s patience, warmth and ability to attract political opponents through persuasion rather than pressure. He spoke admiringly of the Senate President’s smile and suggested that his leadership style had succeeded where others had failed. This was not a routine parliamentary courtesy. It was lavish public endorsement and heartfelt sentiments.

Indeed, Oshiomhole went even further to contextualize his praise of Akpabio. He reminded his audience of his reputation as someone  who always speaks out of conviction, and added that public figures had an obligation to acknowledge success when they saw it.

That was Oshiomhole speaking. That was Oshiomhole’s standard. That was Oshiomhole’s record. That was Oshiomhole being Oshiomhole.

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Now, fast forward to June 2026.

Appearing on a podcast, the same Oshiomhole launched one of his strongest (and strangest) attacks yet on Akpabio. Among other claims, he alleged that the Senate President’s daughter had secured employment at the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited through improper influence and outside normal procedures. The allegation was serious and spurious. It was also, according to Akpabio’s colleagues, completely false.

The Senate President’s Spokesperson stated that it is trite that whoever alleges must proof. He asserted further that none of Akpabio’s children work at NNPC or any of its subsidiaries. Suddenly, the issue was no longer about Akpabio. The issue became a test of Oshiomhole’s integrity and conscience.

How does a former labour leader, former governor, former national chairman of the ruling party and serving senator make such a damaging allegation without first establishing a basic fact: whether the person in question even works where he claims? More troubling still was Oshiomhole’s own explanation for the allegation: “Somebody told me.”

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Those three words should worry every Nigerian. Not because politicians should never raise concerns about public institutions. They should. Not because powerful people should be shielded from scrutiny. They should not. But because a democracy cannot function when public accusations are built on hearsay rather than evidence.

The low standards expected from a roadside gossip are not the standards expected from a senator of the Federal Republic. And that is what makes this episode so disappointing and worrisome. Like the first Adam, this Adams gave Eve the apple of lies and digested it.

Adams should have known better. He is not an ordinary politician. His place in Nigeria’s political history compels him to be more circumspect in his communication. He rose through the labour movement to become one of the country’s most recognisable public figures. He challenged military rule. He led workers’ struggles. He governed Edo State. He chaired the APC at a critical period in its development.

Few public figures have accumulated such political capital. Yet the path he toed which made Oshiomhole formidable now appears increasingly to be covered with indignity and less than noble motives.

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For much of his career, he thrived on confrontation. There was always a cause to champion, an adversary to challenge or an institution to hold accountable. That instinct served him well when it was anchored in facts and robed with decency.

The danger comes when confrontation becomes an end in itself. Then the need to fight begins to outweigh the need to verify. Then attention becomes more important than accuracy. Then the line between advocacy and recklessness begins to disappear. The contradiction in Oshiomhole’s treatment of Akpabio is therefore impossible to ignore.

A little over a year ago, he was publicly suggesting that Akpabio deserved a place in the Guinness Book of Records. Today, he paints him with tar brush as a beneficiary of nepotism. A little over a year ago, he praised Akpabio’s leadership as a model of political inclusion and persuasion. Today, he portrays him as a leader whose conduct deserves public suspicion. A little over a year ago, he was urging Nigerians to acknowledge what was working.  Today, he is making allegations that appear incapable of surviving basic scrutiny and integrity test.

What changed? Did new evidence emerge? Did Akpabio suddenly become a different person? Or is something else at work? Some observers point to Oshiomhole’s growing frustration with developments within the Senate itself, particularly debates around the chamber’s rules and leadership structure. Whether that explanation is accurate or not, it highlights an uncomfortable reality about Nigerian politics and politicians’ sweet descent.

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Too often, political disagreements that should remain institutional become personal. Policy disagreements become personality conflicts. Procedural disputes become vendettas. Legitimate criticism becomes a vehicle for settling scores. And when that happens, truth is usually the first casualty. This is where Senator Oshiomhole risks damaging something far more valuable than any political rivalry.

He risks damaging his credibility. Credibility is a strange asset. It takes decades to build and only moments to diminish. It is the reason people listen when a public figure speaks. It is the foundation upon which influence rests. Once it begins to erode, every future intervention becomes harder to take seriously.

That is the tragedy here. Oshiomhole does not need sensational allegations to remain relevant. He has already earned relevance. He does not need unverified claims to command attention. His record already guarantees attention. He does not need to manufacture controversy and peddle rumours. His experience alone should mean his voice would always matter in national conversations.

What he needs is the discipline that once distinguished him from countless others in public life. The discipline to verify before accusing. The discipline to separate evidence from rumour. The discipline to recognise that prominence carries responsibilities. History is often kinder to politicians than their contemporaries. It overlooks many mistakes and forgives many errors. But history is also unforgiving when it comes to patterns.

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And a pattern appears to be emerging. The labour leader who once built a reputation on speaking truth to power now risks becoming associated with speaking before establishing the truth. The politician who once demanded accountability now finds himself facing questions about his own standards. The man who urged others to “put a record” when things were going well now stands accused of abandoning the record altogether when it became politically convenient.

That is why this story is ultimately not about Godswill Akpabio. It is about Adams Aliyu Oshiomhole. It is about the danger of allowing ambition, frustration and ego to eclipse judgement. It is about how distinguished careers are rarely destroyed by a single scandal or a single defeat.

More often, they unravel through a series of avoidable choices. A careless allegation here. An unverified claim there. A growing willingness to sacrifice accuracy for effect. For a man of Oshiomhole’s stature, that should be the real concern. Because the greatest threat to his legacy is not Akpabio but ego and himself

It is the possibility that, after spending decades building a reputation for courage and credibility, Adams Oshiomole may now be remembered for diminishing both with reckless falsehoods and needless ego of his own making.

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Ken Harries Esq is an Abuja based Development Communication Strategist

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Nuclear Safety at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant under Russian Occupation: Threats, Legal Violations, and Ukraine’s Stance

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By Artem Kovalenko

From the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, disregard for the principles of nuclear safety and security has been a persistent feature of Russia’s misconduct.

In particular, Russia has threatened the safe operation of Ukrainian nuclear power plants, raising the risk of a nuclear emergency whose effects would be felt far from the borders of Ukraine.

Four years ago, on March 4, 2022, Russian military forces attacked and seized the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) – the largest nuclear plant in Europe (6 reactors, 5,700 MW installed capacity).

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Russia turned ZNPP into a military base, disrupted its normal operations, damaged infrastructure, detained plant employees, and restricted access for experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency to critical areas of the plant, making a full and objective safety assessment impossible.

Four years of illegal control pose a direct threat to global nuclear security. For the first time in history, a civilian nuclear facility of this scale is being operated not by its lawful operator, but by an aggressor state.

The Russian Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision (“Rostechnadzor”) directly controls the operation of the NPP and has already launched an unlawful modernization of the station’s radiation monitoring systems without the authorization of the legitimate operator (Ukraine) and without compliance with IAEA standards.

On July 1, 2023, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, stated in an interview with Spanish media: “The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is mined — that is a fact. The IAEA confirms that the Zaporizhzhia plant is mined”.

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Russia’s activities at ZNPP constitute a systematic violation of international nuclear law and treaty obligations under the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994), and UN General Assembly Resolutions ES-11/1 and ES-11/4.As of June 2026, the ZNPP continues to be a critical unresolved issue within the framework of the peace settlement for the Russia-Ukrainian war.

However, Ukraine and Russia maintain fundamentally different visions regarding the settlement of the Zaporizhzhia NPP issue.

Ukraine is pushing for the total restoration of its sovereign control over the Zaporizhzhia NPP and the demilitarization of Enerhodar, emphasizing that Russia must be entirely barred from the plant’s management.

Only this approach complies with international law and stands as the sole option to eliminate the threat of an illegal restart of the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

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Russia demands the preservation of its operational control over the Zaporizhzhia NPP, alongside the scheduled restarting of the station’s nuclear reactors under its domestic Russian regulatory framework.

However, any attempt to restart the nuclear reactors without full compliance with international safety standards and independent regulatory oversight constitutes a direct threat to nuclear safety.

Meanwhile, the US is proposing its own compromise option: tripartite management (Ukraine-US-Russia, 33/33/33%) with the subsequent distribution of the generated electricity.

However, this scenario remains unacceptable because granting Russia any stake in the ZNPP’s management would de facto legitimize the occupation, representing a direct violation of Ukraine’s national sovereignty.

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In response to the US initiative, Ukraine proposes a joint US-Ukrainian management structure for the Zaporizhzhia NPP (50/50%).

Under this model, the American side would distribute 50% of the generated electricity, while Russia would be completely barred from the plant’s management.

This option complies with international law and eliminates the risk of legitimizing the occupation of the ZNPP.At the same time, Ukraine’s core position remains clear: the Zaporizhzhia NPP must be fully demilitarized and returned under Ukrainian sovereign control, as this is the only guarantee of nuclear safety for Europe and the entire world.

To prevent a potential nuclear catastrophe, the international community must publicly support the full return of the Zaporizhzhia NPP under Ukrainian sovereign control, while condemning the illegal modernization of the plant and plans to restart its reactors under Russian licenses.

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Concurrently, it is of paramount importance to endorse the expansion of the IAEA mission’s mandate to enable full-scale independent monitoring of the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

In turn, China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear-weapon state bearing special responsibility for maintaining the nuclear non-proliferation regime, must use its diplomatic influence on Russia to halt the illegal actions of “Rostekhnadzor” and prevent the restart of the ZNPP reactors.

Thus, the only path to restoring security in Europe is the complete and immediate withdrawal of Russian troops and personnel from the Zaporizhzhia NPP, its return under Ukrainian control, the release of all unlawfully detained individuals, and increased international pressure, including sanctions against “Rosatom” and “Rostekhnadzor”.

The ZNPP was and remains a Ukrainian facility, and its return is not only a matter of Ukraine’s sovereignty, but also a matter of global security.”Artem, a public relations expert, writes from Kyiv, Ukraine.

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